

1 What It Means to Experience an Alien Other

In this chapter, my argument proceeds across three sections. The first is largely a terminological introduction to Husserl, so Husserl scholars may want to turn directly to the second and third sections. As an introduction, the first section attempts to introduce the reader, by means of deploying them, to the specific terms that Husserl uses to describe the relationship between the subject and the object and between the subject and itself. A number of key resources on Husserl's phenomenology are included in the footnotes, and these serve as an important reading list for further exploration. This section also works towards the conclusion that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology attempts to unite the experiences of reflection and involvement. And it encourages the reader to think critically about the role of 'givenness' in experience as indicating the intertwining and agency of both subject and object.

In the second section, I move to explicate an important description in Husserl's *Experience and Judgment* of a perceptual conflict in front of a store window. In the window might be a mannequin or a human being. The experience of doubt and conflict that looking into the store window entails allows Husserl to show not only the pre-reflective origin of logical concepts and relations but also the way in which other persons are already necessarily implied in the pre-reflective experience of doubt itself.

The third section then combines the insights of the first two. Exploring the description of the other person's body within the sphere of ownness that Husserl makes in the *Cartesian Meditations*, I argue here that the world offers a gift to each subject by means of the manner of appearance of actual other persons. The way the other appears, as a doubling of one's body and subjectivity that even so retains its differ-

ence, ensures that the experiencing ego, one's own subjectivity, remains thoroughly embodied as a whole and thus is open to the layers of the meaning of the world.

On the whole, this chapter sketches out and presents, *in nuce*, the argument of the other four chapters. The Husserlian revision of reflection, its description of the origin of the experience of doubt, and its discovery of the openness of one's embodiment to the other person are what later chapters attend to and employ in order to clarify how the layers of self and of intersubjectivity propel us towards responsibility for the meanings we recognize.

I. The Natural Attitude and the Problem of Reflection

For Husserl, our everyday way of living in the world, our presuppositions and habits that usually go unnoticed, are what he calls the 'natural attitude.' And this natural attitude has one overarching presupposition: that the world and the things we experience within it *really are, really exist* outside of us and of our awareness of them. Closely related to this are, I would argue, two presuppositions about our own role in relation to the world: first, that the independent, all-permeating being of the world is what calls us to respond to it by *involving* ourselves with its objects in habitual action and knowledge; and second, that our habitual involvement with objects, if and when it is broken, can be restored by our efforts of stepping back from that involvement to look more carefully at the world and at our own understanding of it – that is, by *reflecting*.¹

It is important to highlight this last fact: whenever conflicts arise, our 'natural attitude' motivates and employs our reflection to restore our involvement.² To do this, we must naturally assume that our involvement with the world is always partial, that it will encounter bumps. That is the price we pay for being separate from the world. But we also assume that our reflection is capable of attending to the world and to ourselves in their separation; and, we hope, that it is also capable of adjusting our involvement to meet the world more effectively.

Some examples: a physician struggles to find the right medicine to give a sick patient; a road crew discusses how to patch a recalcitrant pothole; a parent goes to great lengths to find a favourite food to soothe a child; a baseball team strategizes after a loss. In each of these cases in the natural attitude, the world makes such a claim on us that we are convinced that it is the world, not us, that is setting the terms for our ex-

perience, and our reflection has that superiority in view. Therefore our dominant assumption in response to problems is that we need simply to find other parts of the world – the right medicine, a better shortstop – in order to address this part here that appears broken and that can no longer sustain our involvement with it. If the problem lies not in the things but in ourselves, then we still look to the world for further education and assistance.

Reflection, within the natural attitude, might best be described then as a fault that shakes us further from the world in order to cement our relationship with it. If things are going well – if we, like things, appear to ourselves simply as moments of the world – then reflection does not appear to be necessary. And, again within the natural attitude, when reflection shakes us out of our dogmatic slumbers, we are eager to reclaim our lives of involvement after we use reflection to the best of our abilities.³

Of course, within the natural attitude, the relationship between oneself as reflective and oneself as involved participant does not come up as a problem. How reflection could operate in the first place, let alone be successful – such a question seems irrelevant or practically useless.

For a philosopher, however, these presuppositions, the isolation and delimitation of reflection, this unilateral dependence on the world, the relationship between oneself as reflective and involved, can present problems of clarification and evidence: How are we to understand the kind of involvement we have with the world? What evidence is there of the world's separate existence? How can we and the world ever establish (or re-establish) our togetherness if we are as separable as the natural attitude assumes? What kind of a being do I have to be such that I can reflect either on the world, on my experience of the world, or on myself as such?⁴ What is the relationship between reflection and involvement such that we seem to 'turn off' reflection or transition from it back to our involvement with things?⁵

The answer is that, within the natural attitude at least, we do not know. We do not know how reflection and involvement are related or how reflection can indeed pass back into involvement, if the two are in fact different. What we do know is that reflection works. And it recedes. So, because it works and recedes, we accept the limits to reflection that the natural attitude sets. We do not reflect on the relation between reflection and involvement, between consciousness and world. We simply enact it. We enact the relation, finally, in order to submerge the sense of our own being in the being of the world. And we tacitly agree to reflect,

to come home to ourselves, only to better understand the world and the way the world can envelop us.⁶

This rather blind enactment of the stance that posits the separation, superiority, and self-evidence of the being of the world, this acceptance of the limits to reflection, in fact applies even to the way in which abstract scientific concepts or measurements effect real change in the world around us. From within the natural attitude, we simply take for granted that architects use geometrical concepts and drawings in order to build structures that withstand wind, snow, weight, and time. Exactly how do these geometrical concepts work on rough or bumpy material in a three-dimensional world? We do not know.⁷ We simply take for granted that the world is measurable according to the rules that reflection tells us are necessary to comprehend space and buildings in this objective sense.

Perhaps one or two buildings fall down, though – very large buildings. And perhaps, in a series of events connected to those buildings' demise, a country loses a sense of its constitution and its purpose. In other words, perhaps some very large problem occurs such that reflection recognizes it as a crisis, in contrast to just an ordinary problem of the sort that 'working on it' in the natural way will alleviate.⁸ Perhaps then the limits set to reflection in the natural attitude by means of an uncritical acceptance of the world's separate existence is not so comfortable – perhaps the natural attitude passes into anxiety that there is no corner of the world where we can look for ways or medicines to redress the problem.⁹ Perhaps because we have lived for so long in the natural attitude, we, like characters in the Chinua Achebe novel, simply fall apart. When that happens, we feel the need for something other than the presuppositions of the natural attitude.¹⁰

Within the natural attitude, there are two main attempts to address this apparent problem of the dissonance or distinction between the experiences of reflection and those of involvement – before such a crisis occurs. One of the responses to the apparent dissonance between reflection and involvement is realism. Realism claims the following: If my natural attitude dictates that I am separate from objects and others, then I ought to stick by that. Objects and others *really are* separate from me, and any relation I have with them is itself a real thing, able to be broken down and explained by means of things and events within the world – things like family narratives, chemical imbalances, or genetic codes.

But coming to self-awareness or reflection within the realist position would be helpful only insofar as it tells more about what the uni-

verse *is*. Reflection, for a realist, is to be employed in order to develop a greater appreciation of real things. And realists, to be consistent, would have to be materialists. That is, they would have to argue that reflective procedures will eventually decode the relationship of reflection itself – perhaps by identifying its genetic structure, the chemicals that sustain it, the measure of the neurons that constitute it.

The other response to the apparent dissonance between reflection and involvement is idealism.¹¹ From the position of idealism, one sees the experience of the separation of the world from oneself, of the being of the world, as a necessary illusion. Indeed, I must take the world to be separate in order to shake myself towards the greater significance of what I am as mind or subjectivity. To know a piece of wax through changes, as Descartes said, is really to know more about the power of my own mind and its powers of synthesis.

When pressed further with the problem of the *experience* of separation itself, with the problem of the world or of other minds, the idealist might well take refuge in the argument that mind as such, which for idealism is an essential truth, needs to differentiate itself into what appeared as a world, as separate things and other minds, in order to continue to demonstrate to itself its overarching enclosure of all meaning. In idealism, the mind returns to itself by addressing its inner divisions, by *arguing* how what appears to be external and conflicting is really internal and harmonious. In other words, for the idealist, things are simply concepts that the mind gives itself to think in order to move itself (mind) through apparent contradictions or problems towards greater self-awareness. Things are shorthand expressions for what the mind *is*.

In taking the path towards phenomenology, Husserl does not choose between the two possible options of realism and idealism,¹² since he sees no compelling reason to attempt to reduce reflection to involvement, or vice versa. Rather, dissatisfied with both philosophical arguments and with the oppositions between them, he returns to the first position or assumption one makes in the natural attitude – namely, that things and the subject (or mind) *are*, and he asks whether that is the only way to relate to the question of being.¹³

In asking this question and answering it in the negative, Husserl enacts a third, more authentically philosophical position than either realism or idealism by discovering an attitude that is more radical than the natural attitude, an attitude he calls ‘transcendental,’ which attempts to do justice to the original and final unity¹⁴ of reflection *and* involvement even as reflection takes its distance.¹⁵ If an ‘attitude’ suggests some-

thing akin to mood – to a passive deployment of an overarching 'take' on the world – then perhaps this transcendental move is not quite an attitude. For this transcendental attitude is something one enacts by means of an explicit, voluntary, self-aware act of bracketing or *epoché*, which suspends our everyday uncritical acceptance of the being of the world.¹⁶

For Husserl, the *epoché* is the means by which one inoculates oneself against making uncritical pronouncements as to what *is*. What it then promotes is the description of experiences on the experiences' own terms, without uncritical metaphysical presuppositions.¹⁷ Without presuppositions, we are free to become a witness to our being fascinated by an unclear view of the world and thereby to witness both reflection and involvement as needing further attention.¹⁸

The further attention, made possible by the performance of the *epoché*, is something we extend into productive phenomenological descriptions by what Husserl calls a 'transcendental reduction.'¹⁹ The reduction is more than the *epoché*, more than the cessation of the uncritical acceptance of the being of the world. It is an active restriction of the presupposition of the being of the world, the fact that was central to the natural attitude, to our awareness or consciousness of that being.

When we have thereby become aware of, or reduced, the claim of the world's being to a claim of understandability, we find a surprising correlation. We find a correlation between the *meaning* or sense of the world as existing, on the one hand, and the meaning or sense of our own structures and responses, on the other.²⁰

Unlike simple idealism or realism, the position that notices this correlation does not argue that the being of the world is just our own mind or vice versa. Rather, this position, which Husserl calls transcendental idealism or transcendental phenomenology, focuses on the correlation itself without reducing the members to one another. Indeed, in order to differentiate his transcendental idealism from both realism and idealism, Husserl immediately and consistently focuses on the description of the correlation itself, which he calls intentionality.²¹

Intentionality for Husserl can be cashed out by showing how, for each act of intertwining or attention or recognition of the subject, a corresponding revelation of the object, of the world, is attached. Each act, each ray of one's attentive regard – each *noesis*, to use Husserl's language – is attached to a layer, a stratum, an appearance of an aspect of the object, which within the reduction is now something Husserl calls a *noema*. The process of becoming clear about the meanings entailed by

the *noema*, within the noetic acts that attune to its sense, is something Husserl calls a 'synthesis of identification.'²²

In such a noetic–noematic correlation, there is no consciousness that is not involved with the object; there is no consciousness that is not 'consciousness of.' Conversely, there is no world that demands the total subordination of subjectivity. Husserl claims that within the reduction that attunes us to the noetic–noematic correlation, the being of the world depends on the being of consciousness for its very efficacy. But 'consciousness' within the reduction needs to be understood *not* in the way the natural attitude did – as simply a thing among other things that confronts the world – but rather in the sense of the all-embracing correlation of world and subjectivity, a correlation that persistently refuses to allow the subject to be fully and simply present to itself by itself.

If consciousness is, in transcendental phenomenology, that which is thoroughly open to objects, then the self-presence of consciousness becomes a problem to investigate. That is, if consciousness is now not simply the person who uneasily confronts the world in the natural attitude and who wishes to dissolve back into it, then a question arises as to what consciousness is within this transcendental reduction. For Husserl, the consciousness revealed to the one who performs the transcendental *epoché* and reduction is a new layer of subjectivity, one that both claims identification with the self of the natural attitude and enacts a novel distance or difference from it. Husserl's term for this new layer of subjectivity is the transcendental ego.²³

These terms, *noesis*, *noema*, and transcendental ego, are Husserl's attempts to describe how intricately the subject and object map onto one another. These terms keep the very issue of being, of existence alive. Their very novelty helps to thematize, sustain, and describe the sense of the world's existence, the object's existence, the other person's existence as these intertwine with one's own.²⁴

If we look briefly at what all of this means for the description of a perception of an object, we see the following: for the transcendental ego who is attending to the experience of an object, any visually perceived *noema* (say a *noema* of a table) is tied to a particular set of visual and kinesthetic acts, which help comprise the noetic acts of perceiving that I perform, that reveal more of what the table means.²⁵ If I separate each noetic act from the others temporally, I see just how impossible it is within transcendental phenomenology to reduce, once and for all, the object to my own life.

For in each moment of noetic life, although my current noetic act or ray of regard only has within its explicit grasp the sense of a profile of the table, the table from here where I am standing, nevertheless in each profile, in each separate noetic act, there dwells the noematic sense of the *whole* table. I see from here 'the' table and not simply a perspective or a slice of it. The underside of the table, the way it relates spatially and aesthetically with the rest of the room, the way in which the other person at the end of the table sees it – these are all to varying degrees noematic senses that are unverifiable from within the present moment of experience. But in each case these unverifiable profiles or meanings are *given* or pre-delineated with the current profile. They accompany and permeate its sense. Thus, the whole *noema*, the whole table, is sketched out within the current profile, and to that extent, as a sketch, it is within my current grasp.

As giving its sketch, however, the *noema* indicates its power to implicate consciousness in a process of explication that consciousness merely unfolds without dominating. The whole, the further profiles, are *co-given* with the profile that is currently accessible, and the very *givenness*²⁶ of the yet-to-be-verified ones immediately indicates how much more noetic work one has to do in order to describe or to know them exhaustively and explicitly. It is as if the *noema* of the table were already in motion, already exhorting me to walk around it and to see for myself whether what was given with itself, in a rather empty or anticipatory way, can indeed be verified as the unitary colour, symmetrical shape, and so on, that has been both promised and referred.²⁷ It is as if the *noema* as a whole were engaged in playing with me, with my future acts, giving me a future, a responsibility, by means of a gift of itself.²⁸

Perhaps the anthropomorphizing of the table is attributing too much agency to it. Even so, it is certainly true that at any moment, the table means more than I can explicitly verify within that specific noetic act. The *noema* of the table is certainly tied through its references to its other sides to my future noetic acts.²⁹ It indexes them, as Husserl says. But it is precisely that fact – the fact of the *noema's* function as the index of my future acts of explicating it, or of the *noema's* excess – it is that fact by which being manifests itself within the transcendental ego.³⁰

The experience of the being of the world and of things and others within it – this experience transcendently reduced means that we come alive to the realm of *meaning* and how it is within the given system of meanings enjoined upon us by our irreducible correlation with objects that we perceive and move and have our being. It is the given

meanings of these things that serve – more than any certainty of the world's being in the natural attitude – as propulsions to self-examination and self-development with and across them.³¹

On the whole, then, the transcendental reduction of uncritical being to givenness is a change in register, like the way the other members in a jazz group allow a soloist to come to the foreground. Only within this new register can one recognize the particular ways in which objects and subjects map onto one another, can one describe, as Husserl insists we do, the *manners* of givenness of the phenomena and the way that those manners of givenness call for our own acts of making sense of them. Within this transcendental register, we see that neither the world nor consciousness could be without the other, and we see, as Zahavi points out, that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology 'supersedes the objectivistic distinction between meaning and being.'³²

When we stop participating in the naive, natural attitude belief that the world sets the terms for experience, that the world requires us to lose ourselves in it except in moments of breakdown, we begin to see the world in a new way. The world appears as *horizon*,³³ to use Husserl's term, as co-given with the things in the foreground. And both the world and the things appear as co-given with and to subjectivity. In other words, because, through the transcendental reduction, we see that the being of things and the world is co-given as (and mapped onto) the indexical being of our own synthetic acts, we also see that we perceive the things – the soloist, for example – directly, and thus potentially on her own terms, without the presuppositions usually afforded through the natural attitude.

Let us return briefly to the notion of givenness emphasized above. There is an irreducible passivity implied in being 'given.' And while we are reflecting, it is that passivity that motivates and sustains our involvement with the things as things, and not as our simple products. To be given something suggests that that thing appears (as gift) only as carrying the reference to its own pre-existence. At birthday parties, when we open the gifts, we may not know whether a particular gift was brand new or used. We may not know the giver, especially if there is no card attached. But that is precisely the cause of a gift's powerful attraction. It comes from we know not where, and we must now come to know it by paying attention to it *as* given and not simply as a product of our own volition.³⁴

That which is given *is* in the mode of its givenness. It *is*, not because we take its being to be unproblematic, but precisely because its given-

ness allows us to realize that its being, its pedigree, its existence *is a problem*. In its givenness, the world *is*, not perhaps in its continuous maintenance of a reference to a divine giver who is not us, but in its structure as 'horizon.'

As horizon, the world is like the painting or the music that one's eyes move across or one's ears resound with. One has not simply left the canvas or the frame behind to see the apple or tablecloth. One must still hear the rest of the music and silence while listening to the soloist – in fact, one would not hear the soloist as playing a solo without hearing the rest, too. In short, the reduced experience of the world is an experience of the world as pregnant with objects, which are also pregnant with the world. It is this double set of references – the world as horizon and as objects within the horizon – that Husserl's reduction notices, along with the world's double references to consciousness, which itself appears *within* the world and yet carries the world *within* itself.

With the *epoché* and reduction together, then, we perform a reflection that notices the world as a structure of meaning that is *within* our consciousness. This appearance within consciousness occurs, however, *while* the world claims its being as outside of consciousness. The world *is* by virtue of and within its givenness, and thereby it appears as sustaining a reflection that is simultaneously a more sophisticated involvement. For the world now appears as getting its teeth from its involvement with us. And we appear as owing our power of reflection from our *a priori* interconnection with that which transcends us. As Zahavi puts it, 'reflection is not an act sui generis, it does not appear out of nowhere, but presupposes, like all intentional activity, a motivation. According to Husserl, to be motivated is to be affected by something, and then to respond to it.'³⁵

What now no longer compels us is the presupposition of the meaning, separation, and superiority of the world's being. We are no longer convinced that things only appear by virtue of receiving their power from the world. Rather, we notice that figure and ground, object and world, are given together with us, that in some sense the being of subjectivity and the being of world are always already together and that we are the 'third term' by which object and world dance together with us.³⁶

By means of the *epoché* and phenomenological reduction, and by focusing our attention on the field of givenness, Husserl attempts to show how we build up the ability to say, with evidence, what the world and what consciousness are. We build up our ability to describe our related-

ness, our involvement that is at the same time the sustenance and the motor of our reflection, through what Husserl calls 'constitution.' We constitute, we recognize, we lay out, the structure of the given and then make it explicit. Not as a kind of creation and not simply as a kind of explication of what was always already available. Rather, unlike the process of reconstituting powdered milk, we constitute in the sense that we participate with the world and with other people in giving shape and meaning to what surges forth towards us. We do not reconstitute but we co-constitute, and we can do so anew and for the first time.

As Zahavi notes, Husserl 'occasionally speaks about the reciprocal co-dependency existing between the constitution of space and spatial objects on one hand and the self-constitution of the ego and the body on the other.'³⁷ To constitute or recognize spatial things is to be constituted or concretized by their givenness. The being-given of the object, and world, in other words, calls out for the spatial and bodily being of the subject. The co-givenness of ego and body require that we recognize their intertwining structures such that both appear as layers of each other. With Husserlian phenomenology, then, we can recognize how we are intertwined with the world in ways much deeper than is visible in the natural attitude, and how this intertwining supports and calls for the development and extension of a new relationship between reflection and involvement.

In sum, what Husserl saw, like Hegel, was that being is itself constantly showing itself to be relational; it reveals itself within an intentional, subjective nexus of relations. As Husserl explores this nexus, he comes to see that the transcendental ego, the process of constitution of the intentional correlation, is not simply one's own. Rather, the transcendental ego gathers meaning from and inserts meaning into the world by means of the ego's already bearing within itself other egos, other persons. The transcendental ego, for Husserl, has always already been a transcendental intersubjectivity.

Through his *epoché* and transcendental reduction, and within the recognition of the transcendental ego as transcendental intersubjectivity, Husserl discovered two complementary positions that address the apparent tension between object and subject: first, that persons are to themselves and to one another the indices or clues of what objects are (and thus we use our bodies and one another to discover the being and significance of objects); and second, at the same time, that objects are the indices or the traces of these selves and other persons, all of whom discover objects to be given within experience as opportunities and ob-

stacles (and thus we use objects to discover the being and significance of ourselves and of one another).

This whole initial discussion, then, of Husserl's re-vision of reflection, the introduction and deployment of his novel terms, is a necessary step in coming to terms with his project of describing the subject in terms of layers. Reflection cannot be for Husserl a completely separate, divorced act. Rather, phenomenological reflection, as the enactment of a transcendental layer of subjectivity simultaneously united with and distant from itself, allows for consciousness to be more involved (and to notice more) within straightforward experience.

II. The Possibility That Alien Other Persons Are among Us

In order to clarify the method of Husserl's phenomenology, which we have defined as a break from the presuppositions of the natural attitude and the enactment of an attentive openness to the givenness of objects and subjects within consciousness, I start with an example from Husserl's *Experience and Judgment* (hereafter *EJ*) and with the description there of a very concrete experience – *not* of an actual encounter with an alien other person but with a *possible* encounter with such. The experience is an apparently simple one, one that could happen on any particular day while within the natural attitude. It usually lasts only several moments, perhaps the duration of a few glances. But the example is quite important, since it establishes not only the way in which consciousness makes sense of conflicting appearances but also the way in which consciousness itself is mobilized by the very possibility that another person perceives it.

In Husserl's example, one is walking by a store window, sees something within it, and 'hesitates' – is that a person or a mannequin inside? This hesitation or doubt is the very experience of a possibility of an alien other person (someone who is not me, who might challenge, who might entertain me). It is not an actual encounter, since after all it might be a hard, plastic figure there in the window. I here cite the relevant text at length, noting the explicit use of the German verb *überschieben*, 'to overlap,' which is often paired with *decken*, 'to overlay,' in other texts of Husserl's:

Perhaps we see a figure standing in a store window, something which at first we take to be a real man, perhaps an employee working there. Then, however, we become hesitant and ask ourselves whether it is not just a

mere mannequin. With closer observation the doubt can be resolved in favor of one side or the other, but there can also be a period of hesitation during which there is doubt whether it is a man or a mannequin. In this way, two perceptual apprehensions overlap [*überschieben sich*] ... The full concrete content in the actual appearance now obtains all at once a second content, which slips over [*darüber schiebenden*] it ... One and the same complex of sense data is the common foundation of two apprehensions superimposed on each other [*übereinander gelagerten Auffassungen*]. Neither of the two is canceled out during the period of doubt. They stand in mutual conflict [*wechselseitigem Streit*]; each one has in a certain way its own force, each is motivated, almost summoned, by the preceding perceptual situation and its intentional content. But demand is opposed to demand; one challenges the other, and vice versa. In doubt, there remains an undecided conflict [*unentschiedener Streit*].³⁸

The ego vacillates [*schwankt*] between the apprehensions: man or mannequin. The expectant anticipatory intentions belonging to the perception do not give a univocal prescription but only an ambiguous one. This leads to a conflict [*Widerstreit*] of consciousness, with inclinations to believe either of the two sides ... It is in this conflict of inclinations of belief [*Streit von Glaubensneigungen*], correlatively of presumptions of being, that a concept of possibility [*Begriff von Möglichkeit*] has its origin. Being-possible, possibility, is thus a phenomenon which, like negation, already appears in the predicative sphere and is most originally at home there.³⁹

Now, after reading this passage, it might seem that Husserl is concerned here more with the experience of doubt and with the origin of the concepts of possibility and negation in general⁴⁰ than with the particular experience of doubting the existence of an alien other person as such. The point seems merely to be about how logical concepts have their 'origin' in pre-predicative, pre-reflective experience.⁴¹

If that were the case, if Husserl's point were merely to show the origin of logical concepts, then the relevant example could have been the experience of doubt in the face of *any* 'ambiguous' object. However, I argue that Husserl needed to choose this possible encounter with an alien in order to bolster his conclusion that possibility 'like negation, already appears in the pre-predicative sphere and is most originally at home there.' It is the possibility of a body being perceived as a logic-deploying subjectivity like oneself that guarantees the very concept of possibility in experience.⁴²

First, let us use the example to describe doubt more carefully. To doubt is to experience an 'uneasiness' even before one can think to formulate that word. I can doubt and then reflect on that doubt and say, 'I was really already in doubt as to whether that shirt was blue before I put it on.' Doubt is pre-predicatively begun (before I can assign it values and a sentence structure) and then predicatively and reflectively stated and resolved.

As Husserl intimates, however, to doubt is already to engage in a kind of logical operation. Doubt is the ability to link the concept of possibility, 'this might be that,' to the concept of negation, 'this is not that.' Doubt is the ability to experience 'this might *not* be that.' Doubt, in a very bodily feeling of irritation or uneasiness, doubt in the face of competing sights and sounds, is thus already the place of conceptual relations even in the pre-predicative sphere, and doubt shows that at least some logical concepts are most 'at home' in a realm of pre-reflective involvement with objects.

Doubt is something that the subject enacts as a response to the object. For Husserl, the ego 'vacillates' in the doubting experience – that is, the subject *moves* back and forth between the multiple senses that the object could be. The subject thus does not draw its concepts of possibility and negation (which are united in doubt in particular ways) from outside the situation of its involvement with objects. Rather, the concepts appear within the very movement between objects and their 'summons,' which the subject responds to in a 'conflicting' way.

Now it is true that *structurally* the description of the experience of the mannequin/human could have been a description of myriad other things. I can experience doubt as to whether the colour of a piece of clothing is blue or black, as to whether the theme the jazz piece revolves around is Strayhorn's 'Take the A Train' or another Ellington song I have forgotten the name of. In both cases, of colour and sound, the same structure of doubt and overlapping contents, and the same *kind* of experience of conflict, occur – Husserl would not deny this. In all cases of doubting, my own vacillation is the response to the overlapping contents, and a conflict is created insofar as I am compelled to move in multiple directions while I intend to move in only one – towards 'the' answer. What, then, is so special about the fact that Husserl here talks about the experience of doubt in front of a figure that could be mannequin or human?

In this case the *content* sets this experience apart. In this particular experience, *all* logical concepts and tools that one has and is, the very

functioning of the totality of one's logical system, are being called upon. For what is being doubted is not just a quality or existence of some object, which requires some part or facet of one's subjectivity to know it. What is being doubted is the very possibility of subjectivity itself (that which *is* logical) as embodied, the possibility of all of one's own concepts, all of one's own objects and relations, all of one's logical operations, becoming visibly deployed in and by an object there, an object as subject.

This experience, then, is not the experience of either embodied subjectivity or moulded plastic but of the question of the possibility of the perception of another, alien subjectivity as such.⁴³ In this case, unlike other cases of doubt as to the quality or existence of 'lesser' things, it is the mannequin/human itself that must do or not do something in order to prove what it is. In the case of colours, I can modify the light, do tests against other colours. In the case of sounds, I can go listen to the other two songs and decide. But in the case of the mannequin, it is the thing itself, the alien or possible alien, that has the evidence within it and that must enact (or fail to enact) that evidence, which is the evidence of all one's own logical operations. Only then can logic be useful, only then can a judgment emerge.

Because the experience itself reveals that *in principle* this doubt of a mannequin/human can only be resolved by the behaviour (or lack thereof) of the object of one's perception, it is possible that this doubt might *not* be resolved, that the conflict might continue indefinitely. Now it is not likely that such an experience will continue indefinitely, for a person can hold still only for so long and will eventually notice the mannequin's plastic construction at some specific distance. But this empirical contingency (that such an experience usually does not last very long) does not change the fact that the experience is one that in principle requires the object to reveal its capacity or lack of capacity for organized action and logical self-direction. And this means that the mannequin/human doubt-experience is more central, more fundamental than other doubt experiences, since it presents one with the necessity to examine on some level (even if only fleetingly) the conditions of the appearance of subjectivity as such.

To reiterate: it is not simply that one experiences a doubling and overlapping of the layers of one's specific and momentary intentions or their correlated *noemata* here. One experiences the *particular and explicit* possibility (because one is aware that the object may turn out to be another human) of an overlapping of an entire subjectivity similar

to one's own with a non-subjective object. One experiences two layers conflicting with each other that one's own logical operations cannot in principle work out.⁴⁴

As I will show throughout this book, beginning here and especially in the discussion of essential intuition in chapter 2, it is not just a store window, not just a full-fledged object that has similarities to the human body, that brings forth the relation of subjectivity to objectivity. Rather, the alien other person, and the other's relation of what is subject to what is object, is at least potentially at play in any experience of *any* object as such. How is this possible?

It is possible insofar as the experience of the mannequin/human was really two competing experiences. On the one hand, the experience is that of an alien, another human. The body presented itself as at least in some way *really* similar to the body of another. On the other hand, the experience is that of a mannequin. The body presented itself as a simple body like rocks and baseballs, a body somewhat similar to the body of another but only insofar as it was created to *seem* that way. These two competing experiences involved different senses – one of reality, the other of seeming; one of a subjectivity living its body, the other of a body that had the veneer of a subject.

Let us take closer notice of this experience of *seeming* to be another. To do that, let us assume that the experience ended with the perception of the being in the window as, definitely, a mannequin. To appear as a mannequin is to appear as created, moulded, and displayed by another who understands what it is to appear as a human, what it is to be another human walking by and looking at a store window. To experience a mannequin is to experience – at least indirectly, and in a rather distant or alienated way – the others who made and dressed the mannequin. The mannequin works on me, at least in part, then, because it carries within it the very purpose of the creators, this in addition to the very basic veneer of physical similarities to my own body. To experience a mannequin is to experience a host of social, cultural, and economic concepts and perspectives: the perspective of the store, of the plastic company, of the 'market' that would require a mannequin of this type, and so on.

These accompanying concepts are not irrelevant to the perception of the mannequin as seeming human. And they are certainly implicit, pre-predicatively, in the experience of doubt before it. The pre-predicative experience has implicit within it a host of items that are calling for one's attention. Yet they are not explicit. However, the lack of their explication does not mean that they work on one's perceptual involve-

ment with the street and store window any less than the basic physical form does. In fact, the notice of the store window as a *store* window is precisely what keeps in play these various threads of meaning, and the 'hesitation' and 'vacillation.' After all, there are 'reasons' why this could be a mannequin.

All right, one might say, I see how references to other persons, alien to me, are contained in the form and substance of the mannequin. But how do *all* objects, and not just ones made by humans, carry these implicit references to others? For after all, not all objects are mannequins, not all are designed to have human form, not all are designed as such by humans, and so on.

The further piece of the argument is just this: to doubt a sound, a colour, or anything else, to doubt whether a rock is quartz or marble, is implicitly to acknowledge that there is a perspective other than one's current perspective that could rectify one's experience. To doubt is to acknowledge the possibility of doubling one's subjectivity, of creating another place from which to experience the same. To doubt is to treat the current object, the occasion of the doubting, as that which bears within it other sides, as an index of possible movements and responses on one's own part.

To doubt is to see the object from more than one perspective at a time, even if, in reflection, one can only see *one* at a time. Is it this song or that one? It seems that a good case can be made for both. In a sense I hear *both* insofar as they remain together as competing answers. But when I reflect on which one it is, I can only hear now Strayhorn and now Ellington. Thus, to doubt, to hesitate, to vacillate, is to acknowledge that one cannot actually account for how these competing, conflicting views are already united into one problem or experience. To doubt is thus to claim that, if one were someone else (someone with a clearer vision or memory), or if another with clearer senses were present, or if one could see or hear both at once, then the conflict would be cancelled, and the uneasy unity of 'mutually conflicting' possibilities would be ended in favour of the evidence of the truth.

Since one can only ever take up one layer, position, or moment at a time, the very notion of possibility implies the other persons who would both offer and guarantee the other layers, positions, and moments that are necessary for clarity right here and now. Doubt is experienced now. The possibility of doubling oneself is experienced now. If one were limited strictly to one's own resources, to one's own evidence, then doubt, possibility, and conflict could never arise as concepts.

Let us return to Husserl's description above. What is most intriguing about that description is that he discovers that these competing visions, mannequin/human, actually 'overlap' or are 'superimposed.'⁴⁵ The doubt is in effect a *single experience of competing layers*. The strands or layers themselves are *already* one. They play at the same time, as it were. This is why I am bothered, why I hesitate. Both are going on in my experience, and I recognize not simply disparate contents but a *single* conflict, yet I am not equal to the very unity that is a part of my experience. I can only experience 'vacillation' or one view at a time in explicit recognition, although they have made themselves a single unity, a conflict, in my attention.⁴⁶

One is always confined to one explicit perspective at a time. How, then, can the unity 'conflict' or 'doubt' appear at all? The only way that multiple, simultaneous perspectives can present themselves, the only way that doubt can present itself not as *total confusion* or *total impossibility* but as *possibility for resolution* is if the object presents itself, within the *doubling of its senses*, as the bearer of multiple (at least double) views. The dubitable object, *any* object, thus presents itself as shot through with the possibility of an alien, of another who invests that object from other perspectives with whom one works to gain clarity and explicit awareness.

Now in the natural attitude, when we doubt, we do not recognize an alien person either potentially or actually as the condition of our resolving the conflict. We simply change perspectives. We move from this distance away to another one in order to grasp the object more precisely. In this case, the other perspectives that were presented as possible, as implicit in the experience of doubt, do in fact become explicit. We take them up. Moreover, these other perspectives are ones that we *are*, not alien ones, since we each become the bearer of the clearer view after a time. If the perspectives that we are yet to take are alien at all, they are alien only to the extent that they are perspectives we have not yet taken, just as Will Rogers once said that strangers were simply friends he had not yet met.

Yet something is still not quite right. It may be that in the natural attitude, doubts get resolved as if aliens, other people, had very little (or nothing) to do with our process of resolution. But is that really true? These other perspectives that we come to take in order to resolve our doubts about these non-human things, are they not presented contemporaneously? Are they not possible at the same moment in order to

motivate our sequential shift from one to the other? They are. But that means that we only get to take that other view because we have grasped the fact that more than one view is possible at the same time. And this grasp of simultaneity comes from, originates in, an understanding of what is alien as co-given with oneself.

For it is only if the alien other person were necessary for the logical conception of possibility, of the full view of any object given in a profile, that the alien other could appear by means of an object. If the alien other were not implicated within our logical structure, if the stranger were not a full and complete doubling of our own powers that nevertheless *completed* them, then they would never be given *as* alien. They would only ever be bodies, like all other accoutrements in shop windows. Only as both the doubling and the completion or guarantee of our own pre-predicative judgments can we mistake a mannequin for a human or feel delighted or bothered, as in Sartre's account of the Look, by a stair creaking behind us.⁴⁷

III. An Actual Alien Other – There in the Flesh!

If the previous argument about the other person guaranteeing the logical concept of possibility seemed to require further evidence, perhaps that is because the example was one of simple possibility instead of a direct description of an encounter with an actual other person. Let us attempt to offer more evidence for the implications and layering of other subjects within one's own subjectivity by following Husserl when he moves from the description of a possible alien to the description of an actual one. In that move, Husserl shows even more clearly how the experience of an actual alien other person confirms that my transcendental ego, my consciousness as such, is what it is only through its being embodied; and that, through my embodiment, I am fully linked with all other actual (and possible) egos who stand as guarantors of the entirety of my own powers of reflection and involvement.

For this section, I follow Husserl's description of the experience of the alien other person (*Fremderfahrung*) at the beginning of the fifth of his *Cartesian Meditations*. There Husserl assumes the performance of the *epoché* and the reduction, and his description involves the transcendental ego's grasp of its own body and the extension of that sense of body to the other person who enters the field of perception.

A. *My Transcendental Ego Has Its Own Body*

What I will do in this section is show how, for Husserl, even the essential structures of subjectivity – which we, following Descartes, usually take to be an abstract unity of the faculties of thinking, doubting, affirming, perceiving, and willing – are given together, *contra* Descartes, with one's embodiment. For Husserl, the philosophical experiment of reducing myself to what I am alone as a subject – the attempt to experience myself purely on my own terms – cannot rid me of my specificity and particularity. Rather, what I discover is that it is by way of my bodily experience of my own subjectivity that I am given to myself at all.

What might be helpful to keep in mind here is the genetic development of a human infant. For while this kind of description falls largely outside the eidetic description that Husserl engages in the first four *Cartesian Meditations*, genetic accounts of experience are ones he acknowledges as relevant, particularly in section 50 of the *Fifth Meditation*, where he discusses the way a child first comes to an experience of scissors.

To take up the genetic example, then, we can watch an infant. We can see how she slowly gathers her powers of recognition in tandem with the development of her powers to move. At one month old, her feet are still 'out of sight' for her and she does not play with them. But soon after that, her feet become 'owned' by her eyes and hands and, most important, her mouth. Based on what can only appear as a gradual familiarization, reflexive movements (the feet in the mouth) suddenly emerge and she gathers a clearer sense of her whole body. For her, to recognize or own her foot is to come to be able to put it in her mouth. Months later, the recognition of the permanence of objects within her experiential field develops only with the ability to crane her neck or move from a sitting to a crawling position, or vice versa. In other words, it would seem from the way she is growing that consciousness and its conceptual power develop only insofar as her body does.⁴⁸

Now let us turn to Husserl's own account. In the first four of his *Cartesian Meditations*, as in his first volume of the *Ideas*, he is primarily engaged with separating himself from the natural attitude and inaugurating the practices of transcendental phenomenology. In both works, he describes the transcendental reduction as the way in which the ego reduces the experiences it has of objects to the *sense* of those objects for consciousness. To review, that means, for him, that one brackets the naive acceptance of the being of the world and its objects and instead

pursues the way that those make demands on and respond to consciousness's own acts.

The focus of the first four meditations quickly becomes the way in which the structures of one's subjectivity, of one's 'pure' ego, trace the outline for any objective sense that one may encounter.⁴⁹ The object, in other words, is within transcendental phenomenology an index of what subjectivity can do to reveal it, of how the subject responds in order to experience and to judge the givenness of the object in its relations to other objects and to the subject. Indeed, Husserl moves away almost completely in *CM* from any analysis of particular experiences of this or that thing here. Rather, he employs a number of 'reductions' that engage the *eidōs*⁵⁰ or essence of a region or field of particular experiences.⁵¹ It is no longer the *actual* experience that Husserl is interested in accounting for, but the *possible* ones: 'since every fact can be thought of merely as exemplifying a pure possibility' (*CM*, 71). And, correlatively, it is not the *actual* subjectivity that I am here in the flesh that interests him (at least not primarily) but the *essential* or *possible* subjectivity that I am, the '*eidōs* transcendental ego'⁵² that he deals with: 'with each eidetically pure type we find ourselves not indeed within the de facto ego but inside an *eidōs* ego; and constitution of one actually pure possibility among others carries with it implicitly...a purely possible ego, a pure possibility variant of my de facto ego' (*CM*, 72). All of this work seems guaranteed *not* to acknowledge bodies as such and certainly not the actual alien other person at all.

However, in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, Husserl works to overcome a possible objection to all this eidetic work – the objection that all of these insights are true only for the solipsistic subject – by performing an additional reduction or restriction. He requires, in short, that 'we disregard all constitutional effects of intentionality relating immediately or mediately to other subjectivity and delimit first of all the total nexus of that actual and potential intentionality in which the ego constitutes within himself a *peculiar ownness*' (*CM*, 93; my emphasis). Husserl wants to get at the *eidōs* ego, and he wants to do so in the manner in which the *eidōs* is lived as in each case one's own. Yet it is in retreating from the possibility of the other person there in the flesh, it is in restricting the experience of the essence of consciousness, that Husserl notes that one's own body is part of one's subjectivity through and through and that the *eidōs* 'transcendental ego' is lived only by being referred internally to a richer notion of the whole of oneself with others.

Let us see how Husserl shows the transcendental ego to be imme-

diately bodily and to be intercorporeal. First, he notes that the transcendental ego, insofar as it is an *experiencing* ego, when it reduces its experience to what is its *own*, discovers that its body gains central stage: 'among the bodies belonging to this "Nature" and included in my peculiar ownness, I then find my animate organism [*Leib*] as uniquely singled out – namely as the only one of them that is not just a body [*Körper*]' (CM, 97). Experience then is bodily, and marks itself out as such, even when one is reducing experience to its essential structures, to what is one's own.⁵³ Indeed, the very meaning of the concept 'ownness' lies in the essential uniqueness of the appearance of one's lived body.

Moreover, this bodily essence that defines what it means to 'own' experience is reflexive insofar as the body that I *am* can experience objects and itself by means of its organs taking on the role of objects, at least for a time: 'As perceptively active, I experience (or can experience) all of nature, including my own animate organism ... That becomes possible because I can perceive one hand by means of the other ... a procedure in which the functioning organ must become an Object and the Object a functioning organ' (CM, 97). It is the possibility of my actual organs taking on the role of object, of taking on another perspective, and then moving back again into their role as organ – it is this possibility that sustains my possible experience of my body as a *whole*. As my hand turns from touching to touched and then back to touching, I enact the body as the background that supports the hand's alternation. Without being able to grasp it explicitly, the hand's very turning to object and back to organ has made reference to the actual, whole body that I am so that it can also become more explicitly 'reflexively related to itself in practice' (CM, 97).

But the fact that my lived body has organs that turn into objects does more than enable the enactment of reflexive self-experience of my whole body. The organ-into-object-into-organ movement also opens my perception onto objects. It is not just 'my own animate organism' but also 'all of nature' that responds to my organs. And this happens – this nature responds and offers more to me in my perception than I have explicitly – because I share, in the turning movement of my organs, in the structure of objects as *Körper*.

To feel or to see the world is to feel or to see things as corresponding with my own structure, as meant for my organs, as things that can sit in the hollows of my hands or in the pupils and retinas of my eyes as objects of use or of enjoyment. To feel an object is to experience my own

capacity to exist as *Körper*, to feel myself as resonating with the object as *Körper*. But to feel an object is also to see things, like me, as *Leib*; and indeed, Husserl often describes the experience of objects, when we describe them in their givenness, as *leibhaftig*, as there in person, in the flesh, as active, as always resonating more than their adequacy for my organic movement. To perceive objects, therefore, is to perceive them as things that can, in their brightness or heat, resonate with my body as an entire *Leibkörper*. In so doing, I perceive things both as both appealing to my organs to pick them up and as enforcing the experience of my organs as objects, as susceptible to disease or disorder within the world.

In fact, things would not be grasped by me unless they carried with them this dual power, the possibility of attracting me to them and the possibility of directing me from my experience of them to my experience of my body and its organs. Let us stay for a moment with this directive power of objects. The active, directive, *leibhaftig* power of the object to engage my hand or my eye as object is also for the object to sketch out what I can do with these organs in the future. The object from here fits in with my power to verify the other sides of it, which are given emptily in my present view or grasp. The things appear as engaging the whole (and the future) that I already *am*, then, because their ability to object-ify me matches (or can turn into) my ability to organ-ize myself. That is, things re-mind me that my body is both my way of gearing into the world and my way of returning from the world to engage and redirect my body as a whole.

In looking intently at this computer screen for a length of time, for example, my eyes begin to hurt. I have to stop looking. Then, if I rub my hand across my eyes when they itch, the break in my direct experience of the screen and of what I am writing allows me to verify that these two sight organs are grounded in my touch field, that they are organs of my body that work on behalf of the whole and that the whole can work to reintegrate and support. My rubbing indicates again to myself that my eyes are not only organs of seeing but also objects that I can put glasses in front of, organs that can tire through their functioning, and so on.

If I follow through with this recognition, I see that the organ-object-organ structure of the eyes is something I can also verify for (or impart to) the whole of my body (or a large portion of it, anyway) through their very activity. The eyes work to give me this sense of my whole body by, as it were, projecting their own ability to be taken as objects, as they bring the other parts of my body into view. The eyes can see my

fingers typing and the computer screen, and with my eyes I can, at the notice of an inadvertent misspelling, turn my fingers from immediately functioning organs of my thought back into objects that have to hit the delete button, retype, and so on. In the act of revising what I had typed, I glance down at the keyboard, glance up at the screen, negotiate the relation of my fingers to my eyes, and restore the position of the fingers where they ought to be – on the mouse, at the keyboard – in order to return to an immediate use of the fingers by my thought, and so on.

In general, then, the organ-object-organ structure pervades my experience. And it is because of this pervasiveness, because the organ-object-organ structure is initiated from (and supportive of) the level of my whole body as *Leibkörper*, that I can be inserted *into the world*. It is because all my organs can become objects on behalf of a whole that I can be *like* an object sufficiently.

However, even though the experience of this *Leibkörper* structure and its compatibility with the *leibhaftig* appearance of things has been sufficiently demonstrated, there is still a problem for Husserl to address. While we remain within the restriction to ownness, we experience, but we *cannot account for*, the character of the whole body that the organ-object-organ movement requires as its background. When the right hand moves from a touching action to a being-touched, from an organ to an object, it undergoes a qualitative shift of such magnitude that by all rights it would seem that it was no longer 'mine' in the same sense. The right hand can only live one perspective, one view, either organ or object, at a time. Yet the body unites these senses, preserves the touched hand's possibility of returning to function as an organ. How is this possible?

To frame this question slightly differently: one's lived body unites the hand as object with the hand as organ. One's lived body thus treats as two layers of its own sense the two roles of the hand. That must be the case if the body as a whole lives in and through the transition the hand makes between the two positions. But taking the hand's dual role as layers of its own life means that the body is both synthesizing the competing moments together (touched and touching) and preserving their distinctions. How can one's own lived body enact such a synthesis without a full, adequate grasp of *how* it does so? The short answer is that, within the restriction to ownness, and focusing solely on ourselves, we do not know.

None of our organs are sufficient to give a full view, a full hearing, or a full touching of our body's inside and outside. No organ can objectify

the whole body – including itself – while simultaneously maintaining itself as a perceiving organ. But in the face of this inadequacy, how does the whole body as a *Leibkörper* come to our attention at all within ownness? How can our claims to ownership extend beyond what we have explicitly in view?

What we find, following Husserl, is that the transcendental ego cannot discern how its ownership of its lived body as a whole is possible if we remain within the initial, rather radical restriction to one's own body within the sphere of ownness. Left squarely on my own, gazing simply at myself, I cannot verify my own appearance as a totality; I cannot 'own up' to my own power and expanse.

If we return to the example of the infant's development with which we began this section, we can see how the actual, genetic account of human development attests to the experimental character (and limited outcome) of this whole effort to restrict our grasp of our bodily experience to the resources that appear within our 'ownness.' For, like the transcendental ego in its ownness, the baby too is originally given a whole sense of herself, of her body, only in a purely passive way. In this passivity, her wholeness is at one level always already available, without the assistance of other persons, insofar as she can feel pleasure or pain anywhere on (or in) her body. But she also becomes actively alive to her whole body as it grows. She reaches out, grasps, and in doing so claims the project of making explicit to herself what she lives only passively, only as a support. And she does so only by engaging the touch and care of the parent or caregiver.

It is only as the baby is carried around the house, from the height of a chest or shoulder, that she as such begins to reckon more completely with, to expect more from, her own body and her world. Or it is as she discovers her older sister that she discovers (or at the very least enacts) her own power to laugh at, to imitate, and, apparently, to favour in a singular way the appearance of that sibling as the clearest echo of her own bodily life.

Husserl's initial focus within the restriction to ownness does not immediately produce the resources to show *how* we experience our bodies as wholes; this indicates that his focus must be enlarged or amended. In his focusing on strictly *self*-experience within ownness, the phenomenologist did discover something quite important – namely, the fact that subjectivity is, at its core, bodily. However, the phenomenologist also saw – almost immediately, in fact – that in the very act of living it out, our bodily self-experience appears to us as more than we can ac-

count for on our own. As we will now go on to read in the next section, for Husserl it is clear that I can grasp more explicitly the wholeness of my own body, the very meaning of ownness, only if I broaden my focus within ownness to include my experience of the other person, whose *Leibkörper* appears, unlike my own, as one I can in fact directly witness as a whole.

B. The Body (That One) of the Alien Person Exists

As I have intimated in the earlier description of the baby, I argue, following Husserl, that the explicit and full description of one's own lived body, the description of its whole-part logic and of its function as the term that grounds the organ-object-organ movement – all this only becomes possible within the description of the experience of the alien body. It is the other person, through and as her own body, who in her actual intertwining with my own body can view, make explicit, and thus guarantee the whole of my own. A jazz musician can only solo if the other players in the group make room for her, and she can only rejoin them if they welcome her back into the fold. In much the same way, it is the alien person's body that gives me explicative access to the power of my own body to be a perpetual horizon and support for my own increasingly sophisticated, increasingly organ-ized acts.⁵⁴

But in order to substantiate this claim that the alien body is what allows me to live (and account for) my own body as a whole, we must first show how the alien person appears and what her body announces.⁵⁵ In the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, Husserl allows the experience of another person to occur in the sphere of ownness. He does so by allowing any kind of other person, any gender, any race, any kind of appearance of another person at all, to appear perceptually to me. In making this allowance, Husserl describes the other as if he or she were finally allowed to enter my perceptual field for the first time.

By allowing the previously forbidden other to appear within the ownness restriction, Husserl shows that, despite the non-specific nature of the other person that we allow ourselves to perceive, that experience nevertheless works to shock, decentre, double, and totally re-organize ownness.

Previously, when I had reduced my experience to what was included in my sphere of ownness, I had experienced my own *Leibkörper* as uniquely singled out. But when I allow myself to see or hear or touch the other person, when I allow myself to experience him or her from

within my own resources, I see the other's lived body as *also* uniquely singled out. I see two unique and equiprimordial lived bodies, both of which are experienced by me as correlates of my own noetic acts.

To put all this firmly in Husserlian language: in the appearance of the body of the alien person within one's own sphere, one perceives a clearly, primordially, self-existing *noema*. As a *noema* as such, the alien other person still appears as a correlate of my own consciousness. However, insofar as this *noema* bears the sense of *alien*, it appears as the only other correlate of consciousness, which, besides oneself as transcendental ego, one cannot doubt in its connection to *existence*. This *noema*, alien other person, is thus uniquely given as both a correlate of mine and as a self-existing, non-correlative experience. To capture this tension, Husserl describes this *noema* as *apodictically* but *not adequately* given. And this means that the alien other person signals to us that we cannot plumb his or her full significance without further *shared* work.

The reason we have to do more work, the reason that the perception of the alien other person cannot bear witness immediately to what remains problematic in 'ownness,' is that the alien other person only appears bodily through being fundamentally out of reach:

Experience is original consciousness ... The other is himself there before us 'in person' [*leibhaftig*']. On the other hand, this being there in person does not keep is from admitting forthwith that, properly speaking, neither the other ego [*Ich*] himself, nor his subjective processes [*Erlebnissen*] ... becomes given in our experience originally. (CM, 109; my emphasis)

As being given bodily (*leibhaftig*) without ever being originally given, the appearance of the alien person, even though it is my *noema*, maintains its own self-governance. It interrupts the normal flow between me as a subject and the manner of givenness of an object. The other person is not given simply as an index of my own future movements.

If the other person's 'I' (*Ich*) and her lived experiences (*Erlebnissen*) were given originally, as such an index, they would be, in principle, mine. Like a table, which is originally given as a whole within my grasp of its profile, the other person would appear as something I could simply walk around or turn over in order to see and verify all of her. If the other person were given originally, then the appearance of her as a whole would not bother me since the very upsurge, the origin, of her appearance would show itself as having come from me.

But the other person appears non-originarily within my ownness, as showing sides that will never fully reveal themselves to me. This fact makes me, as St Augustine claims, 'restless' to pursue her for further explanation, as the 'origin,' as the one who is responsible for her own simultaneous givenness to and removal from my view.

In terms of its essential content, its basic givenness, then, the sense of the alien body is that of my own. For the other person presents herself to me as a copy of ownness, as another lived body, as another subjectivity, as another process of giving meaning to what appears within a correlative process of subject and object. In that sense, in giving herself as a double, her arrival therefore does not shatter ownness, and my change in focus has been from ownness here to ownness over there.

However, the change in focus is not unproblematic, even if it does not shatter ownness. In terms of the *manner* of givenness of the other person – that is, in terms of the *how* of this appearing alien body – the sense of *not mine* and thus as *mediate* also arises as given: 'A certain mediacy of intentionality must be present here, going out from the substratum "primordial world," (which in any case is the incessantly underlying basis) and making present to consciousness a "there too"' (CM, 109). In my own experience of the other person, I sense that there 'must be' a source, an intentionality, a noetic activity, that gives the other's appearance, a source that is traceable to the 'primordial world' in my ownness. What makes the appearance of the other person problematic, in other words, is that it causes my own world to appear as strange to me.

Though the world remains mine, I cannot force the world to show me an adequate picture of what the other's intentionality is. For the world indicates that it, the world, is the 'site' from which the mediate intentionality 'goes out.' The world, my world, thereby shows itself as a participant in the simultaneous appearance and withdrawal of the other. The world sustains our sharing of it. In its 'betrayal,' the world thereby also offers 'reconciliation' – that is, it offers the possibility of further concrete work, with the other person, on what it means for the other person to be 'there too.'

The mixture of immediacy and mediacy that the world sustains, this strange system of doubled ownness-spheres presenting themselves as lived bodies, provokes Husserl to name this kind of appearance of the other person an 'appresentation' or 'a kind of making co-present' (CM, 109). Insofar as the appresentation of the other person occurs in my world, then, it occurs as if she or he appeared because of a simultaneous exertion on both of our parts. In its involvement with the appear-

ance of the other person, the world appears simply as the trace of a shared effort that cannot come immediately to view. Further explication, further evidence for the alienness of the alien, evidence that would help me make sense of what is not mine about the alien other person, thus ultimately rests with (a) my willingness to pursue contact with the alien person, (b) her willingness to pursue contact with me, and (c) our mutual willingness to pursue, in the world, the trace of our 'forgotten' cooperation.

As an alien, the interruption that she embodies to me, her self-originating presentation of ownness as another bodily life, is something I can negotiate only with the other person. Only by concretizing the initial appearance as a co-presentation through further mutual work – that is, through speaking, interacting, listening, touching with her – can we clarify the relationship between the world, myself, and the other person. My continuous perception of her thus depends on our coming together within a 'functional community of one perception' (CM, 122) in which I allow her, her body, her activities of experiential syntheses to have their say in our shared projects.

C. *From the Alien to the Familiar*

Let us review: In the second section of this chapter we discussed the experience of the 'possible' alien other person in *Experience and Judgment*, and the possibility of logical concepts and structures being embodied there in the store window. In this third section, we have just finished discussing the actual encounter with a logic of ownness, a logic of essence as existence, which doubles our own actual logical structure as rooted in embodied life. In the actuality of the encounter with the alien, we discover that whole subjectivities are given together both as compatible and as at a primordial distance from one another. Further clarification of how this experience of the other person could now propel us towards further explication, towards the unfolding of the meaning and being of objects within the world and of our own bodies as geared into that world and into one another – this remains for us to do.

Here I further explore two key ideas or terms in Husserl's account of *Fremderfahrung* in *Cartesian Meditations* – appresentation and apperception. In each case, the excessive character of experience will become manifest. Appresentation, as we have just noted, will involve the noematic co-givenness of meanings beyond what is immediately in grasp, as in the backside of the table being given in the view of the front. Ap-

perception will put forward the noetic excess of the multiplicity of acts of co-perceiving that occur within, say, the experience of listening to music, speaking to a philosophy class, or attending a baseball game.

Appresentation and apperception, working together as noematic meanings and noetic acts, will help articulate the way in which one's own body is always already intercorporeal. In addition, these two terms and the sense they bring to light will help make comprehensible how the turning of my hand into an object and back into a hand is possible. As we will see, the conversion of the hand is possible only on the basis of the way in which my whole body is given within a network of bodies, of bodily meanings and acts of perceiving.

Let us now turn to the description of appresentation. For Husserl, one of the ways in which the experience of the other person helps propel us towards our own experience is in the other's appearance as 'appresented.' Appresentation, Husserl says, is a synthesis that makes possible the experience of objects as ongoing locales of discovery: 'An appresentation occurs even in external experience, since the strictly seen front of a physical thing always and necessarily appresents a rear aspect and prescribes for it a more or less determinate content' (*CM*, 109). Appresentation is the way that immediacy, the experience of this table, for example, is given by means of an excess, a mediacy that leads one to see further more than is in view at the moment.

However, as was pointed out in the previous section, such appresentation does not provide the possibility for the appresentation of the other person: 'on the other hand, experiencing someone else cannot be a matter of just this kind of appresentation' (*CM*, 109). In the experience of the other person, the 'other sides' of her subjectivity are never fully in view, not even ideally, and they are not preserved as noematic references to my future and past acts.

Even if I can ask the other person what makes him to be him and not me, I cannot thereby receive a full answer, even if he wants to give one. The other person, for example, does not just *think* his likes and dislikes. He *lives* them. And this means that, especially *as* I take them up, his lived relation to what he likes can change, does change in my bringing those things he likes into view for him.

The same is true with his political affiliations. As I repeat back to him what he has said politically, in being confronted with the appresentation of his commitments, he may very easily refuse to acknowledge that which I have in view as permitting a sufficient grasp of his political life. This is because the act of living through what he believes, has pre-

existed and motivated any appearance (or reappearance) of his political expression.

Little by little, in the very appearing of his desiring or political life, he escapes me into other positions. His act of living every determination of his essence, in other words, makes a clear and sufficient grasp of them, and of him, impossible for me.

So in what sense, then, does the same word 'appresentation' apply both to the experience of the table's other sides and to the experience of the other person's inaccessibility? For Husserl, the same word applies to the manner of appearance of both kinds of objects, a table and another person, insofar as the latter founds or supports the former.

The appresentation of the other person founds or makes possible the appresentation of the table insofar as I perceive her as both similar to and removed from me. To the degree that I experience the other person as similar to me, she appresents her whole body as her consciousness. This appearance engages my *whole body*, as the similarity is not just of a foot or of a hand but of oneness as such, embodiment as such.

To the degree that she appears as removed, she takes up a position, she enacts a stance that I am not enacting. In this way, the other gives me to myself, then, but at a distance. She sketches out what I might yet do, and thus she provides the distance, the vantage point I needed in order to 'come home' to my own wholeness, my own self. I could not get all of my own body in view with one of my own organs. But in her distance from me, she functions as that organ that can 'see' all of me. She re-minds me of my own activity of being a whole – a whole that, if I remain within the strict restriction to oneness with which Husserl begins, I cannot describe or deploy adequately.

Not despite but *because of* her givenness as removed, then, the other person thereby makes possible, in her connection with me, my grasp of 'the' table within a profile of it. She makes possible the union of myself here with myself who is not yet, who is in the future; she shows how my current viewpoint can also engage my future ones. She does this because, by virtue of her presence and absence within my own sphere, she connects her noetic acts of perceiving with my own. By virtue of our appresentation, then, as similar wholes, as wholes within the sphere of oneness, we always also *apperceive* one another as actively gearing into our shared 'primordial world.'

In grasping the appresentation of the other person, then, I also immediately intuit, I *apperceive*, her own acts of perceiving as intertwined with mine. I experience that she sees all of me, or can do so; that she judges,

or could, all of me as attractive or giddy or unstable or dangerous. I also experience that she sees, or can see, what I see from other perspectives, which are not mine.⁵⁶

Perhaps I become interested in her reading of a text, her view of a picture, her emotional and intellectual experience of a piece of music. And I listen or read or view again, as if from other sides, as if from hers, trying to see or hear or read as she would. In doing so, I may or may not 'get' what she does. If I am far behind her in terms of practising how to listen to free improvisation, it is almost guaranteed that a single act of listening will still not help me hear anything but 'noise.' But in my attempt to be like her, I will begin to perceive my own hearing of 'noise' differently. And I will discern the possibility of being different, of maintaining a different relation to free improvisation by means of her acuity, which I perceive in her face, in her speech, in her attitude.

The appresentation of the other person, in other words, is also the means by which we apperceive with (and as) each other. This intertwining of appresentation and apperception allows me to grasp that my whole body can be called into play by a *noema*. It first occurs with the other person. It occurs, by way of the other person, with all other noematic correlates. Within our mutual apperception, we function as particular organs that, together, uncover greater significance within an ongoing, paired relationship.

Indeed, Husserl makes this last argument – that the other person assists me in my gearing into the world – explicitly in the *Cartesian Meditations*. To experience the other person as non-originally given is possible, he says, only if 'our perception of the primordially reduced world, with its previously described articulation' *calls for* or 'motivates' the perception of the other as an unverifiable certainty (*CM*, 110). He asks 'How does the motivation run? What becomes uncovered as involved in the very complicated intentional performance of the appresentation' (*CM*, 110)? Within ownness, then, the world that we experience, the total world, has always already 'leaked' evidence of the other. Something in the world colludes with the other person's coming to appearance; something betrays our attempt to restrict our focus within ownness. As Husserl implies, something in the noematic sense of the world *acts*, it calls forth, it requires, it acknowledges the role of the other person. Within one's own very *having* of this owned world, in the very process of an organ-object-organ movement, then, we are always already on the way to a 'perception of the other.'

To further emphasize the way in which the other and myself are co-given originally, Husserl notes that the appresentation of the other person immediately demands something of my own body, something I was not aware of until I examined how the appresentation of the alien body was possible: 'the body over there, which is nevertheless apprehended as an animate organism, must have *derived* this sense by an *apperceptive transfer* from my animate organism, and done so in a manner that excludes an actually direct, and hence primordial, showing of the predicates belonging to an animate organism' (*CM*, 110–11; my emphasis). My own 'perception of the primordially reduced world,' the sense, the experience of the world itself rose up to meet the other and did so by transferring the sense I have of myself, of my own body as organ-object, without really *showing me* what it transferred *directly*.

My objects, my world, my sense of my body have all doubled themselves. They remain as senses, but they also leave me and move to the alien person there. They 'exclude' me by not leaving in their wake the 'predicates' that would have paved the way for me to understand how they can be mine but also be shared.

The world left me and went to her, Sartre would say. But that is not true for Husserl. According to Husserl's description, the world both stayed with *me* and went to *her*. The fact of our sharing the world does not immediately or necessarily descend into a competition for mastery of the sense of one's experience. If we follow Husserl's account, meaning is an issue for me, the world is *for me* to know because I appear *within the world* and allow the world and others to do their work on me.

This mutual appearance to one another is something that Husserl describes as occurring due to an appresentative *similarity* that supports our mutual apperceptive transfer: 'It is clear from the very beginning that only a *similarity* connecting, within my primordial sphere, that body over there with my body can serve as the motivational basis for the analogizing apprehension of that body as another animate organism' (*CM*, 111). The world of correlates, the world that I claimed as simply what I constitute as transcendental ego, then, is a world that I do not simply (idealistically) control as if its status as correlate meant that it was my creation. Instead, as we claimed previously, the world *itself* appears as having an agency that we must have always already permitted and authorized, an agency that shows pre-predicatively to me and to alien others that we are not only mutually appresented objects but also subjects who co-perceive the world (and one another) together.

By motivating our apperception, by 'leaking' my transfer to the other, the world enabled its own verification by making possible a link between what could not be verified, between oneself and the alien. Ours is the appresented similarity that occurs, therefore, as if behind our backs, as if by the world's separable agency – and this apperception of one another, and of the trace of a worldly agency, is the indication that bodily subjectivity as such is both multiple *and necessary*.

There must be a reason, given within our givenness to one another, for our being together. There must be a *telos* to our taking up the world as the site and source of our intertwining. And there is. This reason, this *telos* is the opportunity to attend to the excessive character of the world's meaning, to perceive with one another our shared eruption together across our 'primordial world.'

In other words, if I sense that the world is in some way responsible for our mutual apperceptive transfer, then that is because the world, which remains mine, which remains in some sense my noematic correlate, offers our transfer to us as an excess, as a gift of our co-perceiving. Our world, which is still in each case experienced as one's own, then functions as if an anonymous gift from the future, as if from our future selves, towards each of us in the present. And the *gift* the world made by helping transfer the sense of one's own animate organism to the alien (and vice versa) is the gift of meaning, of possibility, and of fields of further exploration.

After all, the 'exclusion' of direct verification of exactly what constitutes this 'similarity' between oneself and the other person does not mean that we must not seek *further* or *concrete* verification. On the contrary, the exclusion of direct verification bothers us. And we seek the reason for it together in the world. The inability we have to dominate one another's perceptual acts, the possibility of shared perceptions – these are problems and possibilities for us that motivate us to take up what we share as the worldly beings we are.

As I have intimated to this point in the book, one possibility marked out by the lack of direct verification of our interrelationship is further phenomenological description. To pursue our givenness to one another as indefinitely but never adequately verifiable, we could engage in the shared, methodical work of presuppositionless description in order to find out why there is no full disclosure. In this pursuit, our lack of direct verification might translate into authentic, ethical stances. That is, if we took this phenomenological possibility seriously, we could pursue the way in which the impossibility of finding out the source of our relation-

ship might open up new, worldly ways of seeing what we *can* open up together – interpretations of texts, of beauty and justice, of music, art, and politics.

In this sense of taking up a shared responsibility for the lack of verification of our mutual transfer and our fundamental similarity, we turn now to Husserl's further account of how our mutual transfer structures our ongoing perceptual experience of the world as such. Like the transfer involved in the experience of another person, Husserl says, so too 'each everyday experience involves an analogizing transfer of an originally instituted objective sense to a new case, with its anticipative apprehension of the object as having a similar sense' (CM, 111). Objects can sustain histories and sciences of experience because first *we* do. We sense 'scissors' for the first time, or what a party is for the first time, because we use or deploy in a directed, partial way the transfer that we already are *as whole bodies and subjectivities*. We transfer partial senses onto others within experience because we, as sense-transferring whole beings, are ourselves always already transferred to one another.

The world's gift, then, is that the division between myself and the alien has already been fundamentally appreciated, negotiated, and *directed* by a source that operates at a higher level than the difference itself: 'Ultimately we always get back to the radical differentiation of apperceptions into those that, according to their genesis, belong purely to the primordial sphere and those that present themselves with the sense "alter ego" and, upon this sense, have built a new one – thanks to a genesis at a higher level' (CM, 111). Our division, the alien and the primordial, the other and the self, is a division that is 'radical.' What I perceive as truly 'my own' marks itself out as different from what I perceive together with the 'alter ego' or on her behalf. Yet, Husserl suggests here, the radical differentiation we experience is not the experience of a complete splitting. Neither set of apperceptions, one's own or the other's, dominates the other within the structure of the transfer as such; therefore, when we take up a transcendental description of our life together, what we are as perceptual beings is a co-functioning system of 'apperceptions.'

The 'radical differentiation' therefore maintains itself as a unity, as something to be experienced, only within the 'settled' unity of the entire perceptual system. This difference, by virtue of its answerability to that shared source, that 'higher genesis' of the system itself, therefore does not preclude the possibility of connections among multiple, concrete apperceptions, differences, and variations, which all coalesce

or sediment themselves in more or less stable, particular patterns or familiarities.

We are engendered at a higher level, Husserl argues, and that higher level is the shared world and the perceptual system themselves. Each of us is unified by means of radical differences, with the alien other persons by being made *for* a fully and mutually determined world, the promise of which always leads us on together. Yes, it is true, the higher genesis of our relationship will never exhaustively appear or fully account for itself; we will never 'rest' together, as Augustine thought we might, within the full description of the world, within a single, united vision of the concretely determinable 'purpose' of the universe and human community. However, this fact need not shut down our time together; it can on the contrary continue to motivate us to press together towards this 'higher genesis,' this full world of transcendental intersubjectivity, which calls us into our perceptual lives.

As we move on from this chapter into the next one, we will take up more particularly the way in which our togetherness, given within our mutual appresentation and apperceptive transfer, makes possible the adequate description of our own experience *as* our own. We will see how our fundamental perceptual similarities, and their distances from one another, are implicated within our own power to anticipate, within the grasp of this side, what we might *possibly* discover in the other sides of a perceptual object. And we will also see how we can provide evidence for the argument that, because I am not the alien other person, but because I am given with her, I can take her anonymous but *actual* position on a table, a piece of music, or a blossoming tree and come to reckon with and thus to know those objects better.

In light of our discussion of ownness, it might be helpful here, at the conclusion of this chapter, to note that ownness, my own sense of experience, is a problematic notion that needs to be further explored. For Husserl, ownness is not simply preserved, but neither is it erased. The togetherness of self and other is what fosters this uneasy maintenance of the 'radical differentiation.'

If we take jazz as an example for this, we might easily agree that the differences between persons and instruments are preserved in a group. Yet we could also see that solo performances, the chance to 'say' something of one's own within a jazz group, are earned only through hard, specific work with one another. For the most part, a chance to solo is earned when the soloist learns how to move into and out of the group, when she learns to trace and listen to the others, to the group, who is

with her at the base of her musical or philosophical experience. When she learns how her body is implied in the instrument, in the logic of music, in the history of jazz, in this group, with this sax player and drummer and bassist, she is able to play, as if for the first time, explicitly, the piano solo as if it were what was always being called for – a solo of free improvisation that is different from even while nevertheless still building upon the others' efforts.